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How did the financial crisis affect the 
transnationality of the global financial elite?  
One step forward and one step back 
KEES VAN VEEN 
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen,  
9747 AE Groningen, The Netherlands 
K.van.veen@rug.nl 
Abstract Over the last few decades, transnational elite formation progressed hand 
in hand with a deterioration in national business elites. Most studies regard this 
process as progressive and linear. However, we argue that transnational elite form-
ation is subject to a variety of opposing forces, and the assumed progression is not a 
given fact. As an intriguing case, we analyse the financial business elite with a focus 
on the financial crisis of 2008. This international event had substantial ramifications, 
including a possible external shock to transnational elite formation. To study the 
consequences of the crisis, we collected the board composition data of the 48 largest 
transnational financial companies for the period 2006–11. Changes in board compo-
sition show opposing effects. For example, transnationality increased during the crisis, 
but reversals appeared when national governments intervened. 
Keywords BOARD TURNOVER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ELITE NETWORKS, 
FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL ELITE, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
 
For the past few decades, national business elites have been internationalizing their 
operations by inviting executive and non-executive members from other countries to 
join their boards (Cárdenas 2015; Carroll 2010; Heemskerk 2013, 2016; Staples 2007). 
The contours of this emerging transnational business elite have become visible in two 
ways. First, an increasing number of executive and non-executive directors are accept-
ing positions across borders and, consequently, creating cross-border interlocking 
directorates. Second, some directors have even migrated across national borders to 
become full-time board members in other countries (Burris and Staples 2012). Thus, 
while national elites are increasingly subjected to fragmentation and deterioration 
(Bühlmann et al. 2012; Heemskerk and Fennema 2009; Mizruchi 2013; Widmer 2011), 
the transnational dimension is steadily evolving. National borders seem to be disappear-
ing, a transnational elite is emerging and the world appears to be becoming increasingly 
‘flat’ (Friedman 2006; Sklair 2001). 
Kees van Veen 
106  
Unlike the authors of most of the earlier studies on business elites, we do not see 
this process as a linear movement towards further transnationalization. we argue that it 
is necessary to analyse the changes in more detail and to pay special attention to the 
causes of the changing nature of business elites. At a national level, network densities 
differ markedly between countries, which creates a need for more detailed explanatory 
frameworks (Bühlmann et al. 2012; Cárdenas 2015; van Veen and Kratzer 2011). In 
addition, although notable exceptions such as India prove otherwise (Naudet and 
Dubost 2016), national network densities seem to decrease over time and become more 
fragmented. Internationally, however, which is important for this study, integration is 
increasing, but some countries are much better integrated into the global business elite 
than others. Some join the global elite, while others may disappear again over time. 
Why these differences emerge, and what determines such discrepancies in levels of 
global integration over time, is an important but hardly explored area.  
To explore the deeper forces determining elite formation, we shall focus on one 
event – the financial crisis of 2008. The quickly globalizing financial sector was in 
crisis, which made it necessary for a substantial number of national governments to 
intervene in the operations of financial institutions rooted in their jurisdiction. 
Heemskerk (2013) and Heemskerk et.al. (2016), focusing specifically on the European 
interlock network, wondered if the crisis, as an external factor, could have influenced 
the presence of foreign members of boards. They concluded that the effects were not 
substantial and did not really change the shape of the transnational elite. Unfortunately, 
their analyses consisted of interpreting macro-level trends in a wide variety of compan-
ies and did not specifically address the financial sector, which was where the crisis 
really hit the boards. In addition, they examined the relevant macro-level trends, but 
failed to include the more detailed company-level ones. They were unable to determine 
what conditions strengthened or weakened the transnationalization of business elites or 
what individual company features affected the outcomes. 
To bring this line of thought a step further, we analyse how the problems the 
financial institutions were encountering during the crisis affected the composition of 
their boards. The effect of the crisis on these boards is interesting for three reasons. 
First, an analysis of a very specific selection of companies, instead of the usual set of 
the largest companies, contributes to the literature. Second, the integration of financial 
markets had clearly internationalized the boards before 2008. Because some problem-
atic assumptions underlay these international financial markets, a toxic mixture of 
increasingly complex financial products, coupled with short-term incentive schemes, 
culminated in a credit crisis with global repercussions (Bean 2010). The global financial 
crisis of 2008 presaged the collapse, or bail out by national governments, of an unprece-
dented number of financial institutions worldwide (Erkens et al. 2012). Presumably, 
this chain of events left its mark on the composition of the boards in question, which 
gives one an opportunity to study the effects of an external shock and to distinguish 
between the various levels of distress these institutions encountered. Third, such an 
external shock will directly affect the tasks and duties of these boards. Given that the 
crisis is an example of failing corporate governance systems, for which board members 
are formally responsible, one can expect to see severe consequences for the 
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composition of boards commensurate with the size of the problem the financial 
institution faces.  
In this article, we bring two processes together – the internationalization of the boards 
before 2008, and the effects of the crisis on their composition afterwards. We ask a straight-
forward, rather descriptive, question: how did the crisis affect the composition and 
internationalization of the boards of global financial corporations over time? To answer 
this question, we created a new dataset consisting of the 48 most transnational financial 
corporations in the world, totalling more than 1000 board members, and then followed their 
composition and turnover during the crisis. We handpicked the data for the year before the 
crisis (2006), the year directly after it (2009) and then two years later (2011) to determine 
the medium-term consequences. In the analyses, to understand differences in turmoil, we 
related the inflow and outflow statistics per board to company characteristics and especially 
to corporate distress measures. Subsequently, and in an analogous way, we analysed inflow 
and outflow figures with a specific focus on the changing numbers of international directors. 
Theoretical reflections 
There are numerous sociological studies on the emergence of the transnational elite in 
general (Carroll 2010; Carroll and Fennema 2002, Heemskerk 2011; Kentor and Jang 
2004; Staples 2007; van Veen and Kratzer 2011). Many of these focus on boards and 
analyse the nature of international networks, mostly in the form of cross-border move-
ments of executives and non-executives, as an indicator of the nature of elites. On the 
board level, however, there are more detailed studies of internationalization in the 
management literature under the label ‘nationality diversity’. This research focused on 
explanatory factors for differences in nationality diversity on boards (Greve et al. 2009; 
Nielsen and Nielsen 2010, 2011; Ruigrok and Greve 2008; van Veen and Elbertsen 
2008; van Veen and Marsman 2008). These management studies explore company and 
country characteristics to explain the different rates of board globalization and other 
board diversity measures over time. In addition, they focus on the consequences of 
nationality diversity for various company performance measures. This field of study 
complements elite studies, which uses similar data, but both share a lack of attention to 
longitudinal processes and to the direct effects of specific events on internationalization. 
The financial crisis of 2008 offers an interesting opportunity to see how an ‘external’ 
shock can affect the transnationalization of business elites in general, and financial elites 
as a case in point. Whereas most elite studies assume that economic globalization leads 
to the emergence of a transnational elite, the crisis hit the core operations of the boards 
of financial institutions. Although there are many explanations for the root cause of the 
crisis, massive failures in corporate governance clearly played a role. As the US Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) report stated, ‘dramatic failures of corporate govern-
ance … at many systematically important financial institutions were a key cause of this 
crisis.’ Apparently, existing corporate governance institutions prevented neither share-
holders nor society at large from suffering the losses incurred during the crisis. Executives 
had taken irresponsible risks, non-executives did not monitor the operations of financial 
institutions, and they collectively failed in their fiduciary monitoring duties. This was a 
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failure that, in accordance with the essence of corporate governance rules, should lead to 
a crisis on the board and the exit of responsible executives and non-executives. When 
this occurs, it will also affect a key building block of the international financial elite.  
The extent of the exposure of financial institutions to the crisis was directly related 
to the pressure that boards felt during that period and much of this pressure came from 
national actors and regulators (governments and regulating bodies). Consequently, a 
tension emerged between a wish to become international and the national embedded-
ness of the institution. One might argue that the crisis generated a counterforce against 
transnationalization. It seems likely that the global financial crisis delegitimized the 
international nature of a board and put the further transnationalization of the financial 
elite under pressure. One can expect a retreat into national arenas, which would clearly 
have a negative affect on the further genesis of the transnational financial elite.  
More precisely, as an external shock, the financial crisis potentially affects boards 
in two different ways. First, it creates questions about turnover within boards. The crisis 
was not confined to financial markets, but extended into the corporate governance of 
financial institutions. It uncovered undeniable problems in the core tasks of boards, 
such as (a) monitoring executives; (b) risk management; and (c) executive compen-
sation. Under normal conditions, failure of these points would lead to increased levels 
of executive and non-executive turnover (Dowell et al. 2011). The main difference here 
is that the crisis was not restricted to one problematic bank, but was systemic and 
global. As a result, one would expect it to affect boards in the global financial sector in 
general, but particularly the more exposed institutions. 
A second, and related, point is that this crisis not only affected turnover levels, but 
also the subsequent selection for new board vacancies. Consequently, the composition 
of boards can change, so creating new patterns in the development of transnational elite 
formation. In the worst cases, international financial institutions had to turn to national 
governments to save them from bankruptcy and avoid chaos in financial markets 
(Adams 2012). The globalizing financial corporations became unexpectedly dependent 
on their country of origin for survival. This sudden dependency on the national context 
increased the relevance of national stakeholders at the expense of international ones. 
This quick shift in political landscape may have affected the position of international 
board members and increased the likelihood of recruitment of new national board 
members. As a result, nationality diversity on boards would decrease, leading to a 
deterioration of the transnational financial elite as it was developing.  
Detailed expectations: how did the crisis affect board processes?  
Several specific characteristics of distressed financial corporations affect the turnover 
and subsequent composition of boards. Here, we focus on three: size of write-downs, 
amount of new capital raised, and actual government interventions. 
Write downs, capital raising and board turnover 
The financial crisis began in the first quarter of 2006 when the US housing market 
turned. The collapse in the housing market led to a wave of future defaults in subprime 
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mortgages, and the number of problematic mortgages soared; this subsequently led to 
unprecedented losses throughout the financial sector. A significant wave of write-
downs on risky mortgage-related positions, including loans, mortgage- and asset-
backed securities as well as related derivatives, resulted. Distress moved through the 
system and was especially substantial in 2008. For instance, Citigroup announced its 
largest ever loss in its 197-year history when it announced write-downs totalling $19 
billion in the final quarter of 2008. Between mid-2007 and mid-2009, financial 
institutions worldwide reported many hundreds of economically significant write-
downs totalling approximately $1.3 trillion (Acharya and Richardson 2009). The 
effects were particularly severe for banking institutions with significant exposure to the 
US real estate market (Acharya et al. 2009). 
In a non-crisis situation, a financial corporation experiencing a write-down should 
have a sufficient amount of capital to continue honouring withdrawals and other obli-
gations and to avoid its collapse. However, the write-downs during this crisis were so 
huge that capital bases of financial corporations seriously eroded, and their solvency 
became questionable. Some distressed financial corporations had to demonstrate their 
problems publicly in terms of the size of their write-downs and to raise new capital. In 
this context, write-downs capture the losses associated with the risky investments in 
mortgage-backed securities and its fall-out in related products. Capital raisings were a 
good proxy for the extent of losses in that the firm had a need to raise new capital 
(Erkens et al. 2012). Many studies attribute the observed losses to the financial 
corporations’ risk-taking behaviour (Stiglitz 2010). Risk-prone financial corporations 
were more engaged in excessive risk taking resulting in more significant losses. In 
accordance with this argument, the size of write-downs and capital raisings seem to be 
excellent proxies for the level of risk incurred by financial firms. 
Earlier research shows a negative correlation between levels of risk taking and 
executive tenure (Gilson 2001; Pfeffer and Leblebici 1973). Large risks may result 
in substantial losses, for which the executive and non-executive directors are 
responsible and that lead to interventions from the board or shareholders. Given the 
problems in financial corporations during the crisis, one would expect a higher 
turnover of board members when there are larger write-downs and capital raisings 
(Expectation 1). 
Systemic failure, government interventions and board turnover 
Significant write-downs and capital raising led to a second concern in the financial 
industry. If a sizeable financial corporation collapsed, it could spread its problems 
through the entire financial system, causing substantial disintermediation and a credit 
crisis (Dietrich and Hauck 2012). On 20 June 2007, two highly levered Bear Stearns-
managed hedge funds that invested in subprime asset-backed securities collapsed. 
Subsequently, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered a 
further crisis of confidence. If Lehman Brothers was not ‘too big to fail’, who would 
be? From then on, not only the liquidity, but also the solvency, of financial institutions 
became an issue. This led to classic bank runs on several financial institutions 
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irrespective of the fact that they were more solvent than Lehman Brothers. In hindsight, 
Lehman Brothers incurred considerable systemic risk, which led to the near collapse of 
the financial system (Acharya et al. 2009). This stopped only when the US government 
announced its first bailout plan, TARP. 
To stabilize the financial system in late 2008 and early 2009, governments not only 
intervened in the United States but also in the United Kingdom and several other 
Western European countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. They purchased large amounts of illiquid and risky 
mortgage-backed securities from financial institutions and provided deposit guarantees 
and bad bank schemes (Dietrich and Hauck 2012). In a number of these cases, they, the 
governments, insisted on changes in top management as a condition for a company 
bailout (Erkens et al. 2012). In other cases, they simply replaced executives after 
nationalizing. For example, after obtaining full control of ABN AMRO in 2008, the 
Dutch government appointed the former Dutch minister of finance, Gerrit Zalm, as 
CEO. In this way, the governments triggered resignations at some financial corpor-
ations and appointed new board members at others. 
Hence, a government bailout is an indication that a financial corporation should 
seriously worry about its ability to survive. There is an expectation that intervening 
governments should hold the corporate decision makers responsible for this and replace 
them with others who do not bear the burden of earlier failed policies. In the event of 
government intervention, one would expect to see an increased level of turnover 
(Expectation 2). 
Consequences for nationality diversity of boards 
The second question focuses on the effects of the financial crisis on the formation of a 
transnational business elite. Over the last two decades, executive and non-executive 
directors from other countries have increasingly populated the boards of financial 
institutions. Alongside the globalization of financial markets, the diversity of nation-
alities on boards has increased over time (Greve et al. 2009). In other words, more 
executives were leaving home to work for financial corporations in other countries. In 
fact, non-executive directors were starting to serve on boards across borders and, once 
they had multiple directorates, they would create cross-border interlocking directorates 
(Burris and Staples 2012). These cross-border activities demonstrate that separate 
national elites slowly integrate into one transnational business elite (Heemskerk 2011; 
van Veen and Kratzer 2011). The number of international directors on boards was on 
the rise, as was the density of the transnational interlocking directorates. 
In the second analysis, we focus on the selection of new board members in the 
context of the financial crisis and pay special attention to changes in the diversity of 
nationalities (otherwise stated as a presence of international directors). Our expectation 
is that, the greater the financial distress of a financial corporation, the greater the like-
lihood of its board having to turn to its national government for help. When 
governments step in to prevent the serious national consequences of failing banks, the 
latter tend to revert to their national roots and lose their international outlook. 
How did the financial crisis affect the transnationality of the global financial elite? 
 111 
Consequently, one would expect to see a decrease in the diversity of nationalities on 
these boards over time.  
There are two possible explanations for this. First, theories about board diversity 
hold that heterogeneity improves a firm’s performance (Hambrick et al. 1996). How-
ever, in times of distress, smaller, more homogenous boards are often portrayed as more 
effective and more likely to secure the firm’s survival (Dowell et al. 2011). In line with 
this argument, national candidates are familiar with the company’s home country and 
do not need additional time to adapt to a new nation, culture and language. Instead, 
national members can have a direct impact on the organization and attempt to improve 
the situation from the start of their appointment. Consequently, higher levels of distress 
should lead to a decrease in nationality diversity, thus implying a weakening of the 
transnational business elite (Expectation 3). 
Second, financial corporations experiencing more extreme distress turned – either 
voluntarily or involuntarily – to national governments for survival and the govern-
ments had no option but to use taxpayers’ money to save them. Consequently, 
politicians had to ‘sell’ these policies to their constituents and explain why they used 
national taxes on an essentially international financial problem. To signal that this was 
a ‘once and never again’ situation, the governments had to show that they were in 
control of the outcome. Under such circumstances, people expect their government to 
favour national interests, which effectively leads to national pressure to reduce the 
international composition of boards. 
This lowering of overall nationality diversity can result from a range of government 
decisions. First, ‘replacing’ international board members with nationals can be an act 
of economic nationalism. For instance, international board members signal a com-
pany’s trustworthiness to international financial markets (Oxelheim and Randøy 2003; 
Oxelheim et al. 2013), whereas national ones signal it to the national tax payers who 
are saving the financial corporations from their risky (international) activities. How-
ever, we found no clear indications of such crude measures when collecting the data. 
Second, and more likely, the process may develop more implicitly. Governments can 
start to add national board members who effectively dilute the international character 
of the board. Observing the increasing importance of national stakeholders might make 
the international board members feel uncomfortable and increase the likelihood of their 
departure. The financial crisis clearly increased the importance of national stakeholder 
at the expense of the international ones, but it might take time before this starts to show 
in the numbers. As a result, government interventions could lead to a further 
deterioration of the transnationality of the financial elite (Expectation 4). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The sample 
For the analyses, we used a list of the 50 largest transnational financial corporations 
(TNCs), which the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) published in 2008 (see Appendix 1). While the corporations on the list are 
the most active internationally, they do not represent all financial corporations, or even 
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the entire financial sector. However, it has a few advantages. It contains most of the 
largest financial corporations in the world and since most of these fall into the category 
‘too big to fail’, governments are likely to intervene when they are in distress. Finally, 
a potential bias towards more international financial corporations reduces overall 
generalizability. However, the list is helpful for studying transnational elites because it 
contains the companies in which transnationalization is most likely to occur.  
We studied the composition of the board of each financial corporation at three 
different points in time. Since the market first realized the severity of the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in 2007 (Ryan 2008), we decided to use the end of 2006 as the baseline 
measure (t0). The massive government bailouts started in October 2008 and most 
analysts agreed that the official end of the financial crisis came when the financial 
markets stabilized in 2009 (Sherman 2011). We decided to take the composition of the 
board at the end of 2009 as the second measurement point (t1). Since most of the 
bailouts were taking place at that time, it was possible to equate the stress with board 
composition. We subsequently added the end of 2011 as an extra measurement point 
(t2) with a view to studying the effects in the longer run. Stress does not always directly 
change the composition of a board and the reputational fallout can continue for a while.  
Subsequently, we handpicked data on each of the 1687 individual incumbents who 
served on the boards for one or more years during that period. In the cases of one-tier 
boards, we included the board members and the members of the executive teams as 
defined in the annual reports. For two-tier boards, we included both the supervisory and 
executive boards. Only once we had obtained all the nationality and personal 
information for each of the three measurement points did we include the financial 
corporations in the final sample. Subsequently, there were no problems with left or right 
censored firm observations. This procedure resulted in a list of 48 firms dispersed over 
15 countries (see Appendix 1). The database includes 1030 board members for the end 
of 2006; 1025 board members for the end of 2009; and 1025 for the end of 2011.  
Data on board members came primarily from annual reports and company websites. 
We also consulted articles from the Financial Times, Business Week and other media 
sources for additional career information. We gathered most of the financial 
information from DATASTREAM and the Bloomberg WDCI menu, which 
encompasses banks, brokers, insurance companies and government-sponsored entities 
(such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae). 
Variables 
We operationalized the main variables as follows. 
Turnover: this variable consists of the number of board members who resigned 
relative to the size of the board at t0. In this article, we are particularly interested in 
board departures related to corporate distress. However, board departures take several 
forms, including death, illness, mandatory retirement, early retirement for personal 
reasons, a new job elsewhere and dismissal. Companies often fail to disclose the real 
reason for a member’s departure for fear of damaging company or personal reputations. 
This makes it virtually impossible to collect reliable data on individual board departures 
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on a larger scale, which is a limitation of departure studies in general. However, to 
solve this problem elegantly, we do not focus on individual reasons for a departure but 
use a rougher and more distant measure – board-level turnover. An increase in distress 
increases the likelihood of more executives and non-executives leaving. 
Nationality diversity: to code the nationality of board members, we first established 
whether the companies themselves kept records of their nationalities. If not, we 
searched other public sources such as Business Week or Reuters for their places of birth. 
If there were still remaining doubts, we would take additional indicators into account, 
such as place of education or previous employer’s country of origin. Consistent with 
previous research, ‘international’ or ‘foreign’ board members are people whose 
nationality does not match the country in which the company has its headquarters. In 
the few cases where individuals held dual citizenship, we conservatively coded them 
as ‘national’ rather than ‘international’. We employed the proportion of international 
directors on a board as a proxy for nationality diversity. Subsequently, we calculated 
‘changes in nationality diversity’ within the two periods (t0-t1 en t1-t2) by subtracting 
proportions of both time periods. 
Distress in financial corporations I: write-downs and capital raisings. Two indi-
cators represent the level of distress during the crisis – the absolute size of a corpor-
ation’s write-downs and the absolute amount of new capital to be raised. We often took 
these measures to capture the losses related to mortgage-backed securities, loan port-
folios and investments in other firms (such as Lehman Brothers or Icelandic banks). 
The financial news and data service, Bloomberg, collected data on accounting write-
downs and new capital raisings during the crisis period, measuring write-downs and 
capital raisings from the first quarter of 2007 until the third quarter of 2008. Appendix 
2 contains an overview of these figures. 
Distress in financial corporations II: government interventions. Distress has a 
second dimension. Does the government intervene when a financial corporation fails? 
Here, the size of the ‘bailout’, which can take the form of loans, bonds, stocks or cash 
and which may or may not require reimbursement, is the optimal measure. Two other 
factors are whether the government intervened (yes/no), and constructing a variable to 
reflect the total size of the government intervention in billions of dollars. 
Table 1 exhibits correlations between the various crisis interventions in financial 
corporations. It demonstrates that the size of write-downs and capital raising correlate 
almost perfectly. As expected, the actual government interventions also correlate with 
these two variables. However, the amount of government support correlates especially 
strongly with the other financial distress parameters. This shows that governments 
initiated actions when distress levels were rising and financial corporations were ‘too 
big to fail’. Due to these higher correlations between these different distress indicators 
and to avoid collinearity problems, we opted to use only two independent variables in 
the following regression analyses. 
Control variables. We employ a few control variables to rule out alternative explan-
ations. For the question of turnover, we include firm size by taking the logarithm of the 
total assets and number of employees of each financial corporation. Several studies 
suggest that larger firms are more likely to dismiss executives than smaller firms (Allen 
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1981; James and Soref 1981; Salancik and Pfeffer 1980). They think that the difference 
is due to a correlate of size and the pool of managerial talent (Dalton and Kesner 1983; 
Pfeffer and Moore 1980). Simply stated, a dissatisfied board of a larger firm would be 
more likely to dismiss executives because it has readily available alternatives from its 
larger internal pool of managerial talent. We derived the size data from the original 
UNCTAD list (see sample procedures). 
Table 1: Pearson correlations between the four different stress measures of 48 of 













Write down (size) 1.00    
Capital raising (size) .95** 1.00   
Government intervention (Y/N) .37** .40** 1.00  
Government intervention (size) .71** .67** .58** 1.00 
To control for differences in international activities of the financial TNCs in the 
sample, we used ‘number of foreign affiliates’ and ‘number of host countries’. As 
earlier research indicates, differences in the level of international activities correlate 
with the number of international directors within boards (Nielsen 2009; Oxelheim et al. 
2013; van Veen and Marsman 2008). 
Analyses 
To establish the effects of the financial crisis, we first study board turnover patterns 
during the crisis. In Table 2, we present the inflow and outflow of board members 
between the three measurement points. At the diagonal, we present the total number of 
board positions per years. These numbers are remarkably stable over time. Of a total of 
1030 board positions in 2006, 1025 remained in 2011. Subsequently, we present the 
percentage of inflow and outflow in the different years. As Table 2 illustrates, of the 
1030 board members by the end of 2006, 606 had left by the end of 2011 (= 58.8 per 
cent). The inflow and outflow percentages over the years are also remarkably stable. If 
one controls for the different periods between the three measurement points, it turns 
out to be around 14 per cent each year over the five years studied. In terms of board 
turnover, there are no specific differences between the different phases of the crisis. 
Do these macro-level numbers imply that corporate distress during the crisis is 
unrelated to board turnover? On a corporate level, the figures can still fail to reveal a 
hidden turnover pattern. To explore this possibility, we correlated the absolute board 
outflow and inflow numbers per corporation with a variety of distress measures and 
other corporate characteristics (see Table 3). The results indicate some remarkable 
patterns. The four distress measures exhibit a sound and significant correlation with  
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Table 2: Absolute and relative numbers of inflows and outflows on the boards of 




 = inflow 
 = outflow 
 = totals per year 
board outflow between 2006 and 2009. Exactly how the underlying process works is a 
bit unclear with these univariate correlations, considering that these correlate substan-
tially among themselves (see Table 1). Correlations with the outflow are much lower 
in the 2009–11 period. Correlations with the inflow of new board members demonstrate 
the same pattern. This suggests that both outflow and inflow were especially high in 
the financial corporations with higher levels of distress during the crisis years. Financial 
corporations with less distress apparently decreased their turnover in this period which 
compensates for the stable overall turnover numbers. In the second period, the turnover 
levels are lower and appeared normal again with respect to board inflow and outflow 
statistics. Overall, this confirms our first expectation. 
Company characteristics also show an interesting pattern of correlations with the 
outflow and inflow of board members. Correlations with company size (total assets and 
number of employees) are low in both periods and not significant. However, turnover 
correlates quite strongly with the international nature of financial corporations, 
 2006 2009 2011 
2006 
 
445 (43.2%) 606 (58.8%) 
2009 440 (42.9%) 
 
272 (26.5%) 
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especially in terms of the outflow numbers. The more foreign affiliates and the higher 
its scores on the GSI index, the higher the turnover during the crisis period. The second 
period does not demonstrate a meaningful pattern. 
Table 3: Correlation table with absolute in- and outflows related to corporate 
characteristics 












Write down (size) .49 (.00) *** -.17 (.24) .52 (.00) *** -.02 (.89) 
Capital raising (size) .50 (.00) *** -.18 (.23) .54 (.00) *** -.04 (.80) 
Government intervention (Y/N) .33 (.02) *** -.22 (.13) .44 (.00) *** -.03 (.86) 
Government support (size) .55 (.00) *** -.04 (.80) .55 (.00) *** -.10 (.52) 
Total Assets .21 (.15) *** -.07 (.61) .29 (.05) *** -.05 (.76) 
Total number of employees .10 (.51) *** -.05 (.75) .11 (.45) *** -.23 (.11) 
Number of foreign affiliates .43 (.00) *** -.12 (.40) .38 (.01) *** -.08 (.58) 
GSI-Index .35 (.01) *** -.14 (.34) .33 (.02) *** -.02 (.91) 
Table 4A: Regression analyses – outflow proportions per board explained 








 Beta p Beta p Beta p Beta p 
Total assets -.16 .38* -.03 .86* -.10 .58 -.15 .43* 
Total employees -.48 .03* -.44 .02* -.41 .09 -.49 .05* 
# foreign affiliates -.40 .06* -.37 .04* -.02 .92 -.14 .53* 
# host countries -.06 .81* -.02 .93* -.23 .36 -.13 .64* 
Capital raising   -.04 .82*   -.19 .43* 
Size government 
intervention   -.64 .00***   -.13 .54* 
 R2 = .16  
F = 2.07 p=.10 
R2 = .50  
F = 6.80 p=.00 
R2 = .07  
F = .79 p=.54 
R2 = .10  
F = .76 p=.60 
All VIF values are below 3.5 so there is no sign of collinearity. 
 * = p < .05 
 ** = p < .01 
*** = p < .001 
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Table 4B: Regression analyses – inflow proportions per board explained 








 Beta p Beta p Beta p Beta p 
Total assets -.21 .27 -.12 .45* -.20 .27* -.21 .27* 
Total employees -.44 .06 -.42 .03* -.58 .01* -.60 .01* 
# foreign affiliates -.20 .37 -.27 .14* -.01 .99* -.03 .89* 
# host countries -.11 .65 -.04 .84* -.25 .29* -.28 .29* 
Capital raising   -.01 .94*   -.03 .90* 
Size government 
intervention   -.58 .00***   -.09 .68* 
 R2 = .10  
F = 1.20 
p=..37 n=48 
R2 = .44  
F = 5.47 
p=.00 n=48 
R2 = .14  
F = 1.78 
p=.15 n=48 
R2 = .15  
F = 1.25 
p=.30 n=48 
All VIF values are below 3.4 so there is no sign of collinearity. 
 * = p < .05 
 ** = p < .01 
*** = p < .001 
How do patterns of the inflow and outflow of boards relate to financial distress 
levels when we combine the explanatory variables? Considering the structure of the 
dataset (boards nested within firms, a rather specific sample with 48 financial corpor-
ations, three different data points with an in-between event), a variety of more advanced 
statistical techniques seem potentially relevant at first. After a careful evaluation, these 
were all dropped for a variety of reasons. For instance, panel data analyses are not very 
helpful considering that we only have three measurement points. In addition, ‘differ-
ence-in-differences methods’ are unsuitable due to a lack of a clear distinction between 
treatment and control group. Ultimately, we decided on a series of ordinary least 
squares linear regression analyses on both time periods due to its straightforward 
application and interpretations. 
Table 4 presents a series of these analyses. Table 4A analyses the percentage of 
board outflow per period. Each of the periods has a baseline model consisting of 
relevant corporate level control variables (total assets, number of employees, number 
of foreign affiliates, number of host countries). The results demonstrate a remarkable 
pattern. To begin with, the control variables explain little about the board dynamics for 
both periods. For the period 2006–09, the addition of two distress measures signifi-
cantly improves the model. This has two implications. First, Model 2 depicts that the 
amount of extra capital raised during the crisis did not affect outflow at all. Within the 
boards, it seems business as usual. Second, the extent of government intervention has 
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a strong effect on the outflow of board members. However, this effect disappeared in 
the period after the crisis.  
In Table 4B, the same pattern for the inflow percentages is evident. Three of the 
four models do not fit very well. However, only the model that contains the size of the 
government intervention during the crisis makes a large leap in terms of its explained 
variance. When governments intervene, they appear to enforce a substantial inflow of 
new board members. Overall, these findings confirm our second expectation. 
What does this imply for nationality diversity within boards? As mentioned, one 
expects the numbers of international directors to decrease when financial corporations 
are in distress and when governments intervene. Our data exhibit otherwise when we 
just look at the frequencies. In 2006, there were 233 (22.6 per cent) international board 
members in our total sample. In 2009, their numbers increased to 252 (24.6 per cent). 
The period until 2011 again exhibited a minor decrease with 249 (24.3 per cent) in 
international directors. Contrary to our third expectation, it seems that the financial 
crisis has strengthened the transnational business elite instead of weakening it. 
Absolute numbers do not tell the entire story. To create a better understanding, we 
employed regression models to comprehend the effect of the different stress measures 
on the proportion of international board members. The results are in Table 5.  
Table 5: Regression analyses: change in proportions of international directors 
per board explained 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 












Constant         
Total assets -.23 .22 -.24 .21 -.23 .21 -.29 .10** 
Total # of employees -.40 .09 -.34 .14 -.26 .25 -.14 .50** 
# foreign affiliates -.17 .44 -.10 .64 -.42 .06 -.31 .13** 
# host countries -.12 .64 -.31 .24 -.10 .66 -.34 .17** 
Capital raising   -.39 .10   -.61 .01** 
Government inter-
vention (size)   -.07 .72   -.45 .02** 
 R2 = .09  
F = 1.07 
p=..39 n=48 
R2 = .17  
F = 1.41 p=.23 
n=48 
R2 = .15  
F =1.89 p=.13 
n=48 
R2 = .30  
F = 2.90 p=.02 
n=48 
All VIF values are below 3.4 so there is no sign of collinearity. 
 * = p < .05 
 ** = p < .01 
*** = p < .001 
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The results show a different pattern. Model 1 demonstrates the baseline model with 
only control variables on a company level during the crisis years 2006–09. Model 2 
adds the two distress indicators in the same period. In both cases, the models have a 
rather low fit. There are no significant effects of these stress measures on the proportion 
of international board members. Therefore, our third expectation is unconfirmed. 
Models 3 and 4 represent the changes in the period of 2009–11 following the crisis. 
Here, the results begin to diverge. Compared with the other models, Model 4 fits nicely 
for two reasons. First, and consistent with our fourth expectation, the larger the govern-
ment intervention, the more the proportion of international board directors decreased. 
Therefore, government intervention negatively affects this indicator for the genesis of 
the transnational business elite. However, the results also indicate that the more capital 
a financial corporation needed to raise during the crisis, the more significant its increase 
in proportion to international board members. Apparently, raising (foreign) capital has 
stimulated the recruitment of international board members. International investors met 
the short-term need for greater amounts of capital and increased their influence on the 
boards of these financial corporations. Hence, the conclusion about the negative effect 
on the transnational business elite was only partly true. Yes, government intervention 
led to a decreasing proportion of international board members, but the crisis also 
seemed to have created new opportunities for international board members. It counter 
balanced the effect of the government and strengthened the transnational financial 
elite. 
Table 5 illustrates a second interesting point. The significant relationships found in 
Model 4 imply that the effects of both capital raising and government interventions are 
evident in the second period; the period when the first distress was over. If we combine 
the results of Tables 4A, 4B and 5, it becomes apparent that raising capital did not lead 
to extra turnover on the board. However, it did lead to higher proportions of inter-
national board members between 2009 and 2011. So, an adaptation of recruitment 
strategies followed the extra capital inflow and this subsequently led to more inter-
national directors. The tables also exhibit that government interventions significantly 
affected the outflow and inflow of the board during the time of distress. Although they 
had not yet affected the proportions of international board members, the number of 
international directors began to decrease in the period following the crisis. Apparently, 
the government interventions did not immediately affect international directors, but 
national board members were directly responsible for the burden. However, with some 
delay, the new dynamics on the board soon began to affect the position of international 
board members and led to a significant decrease in their representation. It is possible 
that international directors complete their terms on boards but, once they leave, national 
representatives replace them. So, overall, this partly confirms our fourth expectation. It 
is not financial distress itself that has led to a decrease in nationality diversity. When 
financial corporations solved their own financial problems, the internationalization was 
even higher, which meant a further step in the transnationalization of the financial 
elites. Only when national governments had to intervene, was there a decrease in 
nationality diversity, which reversed the further genesis of the transnational business 
elite. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
So how did the financial crisis affect the transnationality of the financial elite? In 
investigating the 48 most transnational financial corporations, it appears as if the crisis 
did not affect inflow and outflow of board members over time. In general, inflow and 
outflow levels of board members seem remarkably stable for a crisis of this magnitude 
with clear corporate governance dimensions. These results also seem to be in line with 
the general findings of Heemskerk et al. (2016), who conclude that the financial crisis 
has not retrenched national elites into their national contexts. The transnational part of 
the elite remained largely intact. 
From a detailed analysis of the inflow and outflow of board members, an alternative 
pattern emerges. First, the apparent stability over time conceals a dynamic process on 
a micro level. Financial corporations with substantial distress demonstrated higher 
levels of board member inflow and outflow during the crisis years. These elevated 
numbers were, however, compensated by a reduction of inflow and outflow in financial 
corporations with lower levels of distress. One can theorize that existential questions 
confronted all financial corporations during the panic in the financial markets. This 
required experienced board members to develop a corporate strategy out of their 
financial trouble. Board turnover could only add to the turmoil a financial corporation 
was in. These companies deliberately reduced turnover until the financial distress was 
under control. However, financial damage differed between corporations. As the results 
indicate, the greater the distress of the financial corporation, the greater the chances of 
a voluntary or involuntary turnover of board members. 
Considering this pattern in turnover, we analysed the effect of the crisis on the trans-
national financial elite formation by studying levels of nationality diversity within these 
boards over time. The results reveal that the financial crisis affected the transnationality 
of the elite in two opposing directions. On the one hand, the higher the distress, the 
more financial corporations had to write down losses and the more they had to raise 
new capital. The higher a financial corporation scored on these measures, the higher 
the nationality diversity levels, especially in the second period. Apparently, the crisis 
strengthened the transnationality of the financial elite if financial corporations solved 
problems via (international) capital markets. On the other hand, when the financial 
distress of these corporations reached a dangerous level, governments intervened. Once 
financial corporations were subject to government interventions, the opposite hap-
pened. International directors began to leave (voluntarily or involuntarily) and national 
candidates replaced them. The levels of nationality diversity began to diminish in these 
cases. Taking this together, it implies that Heemskerk et al. (2016) is correct that 
business elites remained intact during and after the financial crisis. Even if we restrict 
ourselves to the financial elite, which was at the heart of the crisis, the macro-level 
conclusion is that the elite has not drawn back to its national roots. However, more 
detailed analyses show that there were observable changes at the micro-level. The level 
of distress of financial institutions relates to board composition processes in a variety 
of ways. As a result, the financial elite seems intact overall, but this is the result of 
countervailing board level dynamics that seem to even each other out. 
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Our findings raise a few issues that have wider ramifications. First, they stress that 
the formation of the transnational aspect of the financial elite is not an unhindered linear 
process, but one that is subject to ongoing board dynamics within companies. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, there seems to be either a strengthening or a weakening of 
the internationalization of the financial elite. Elites are dynamic over time and the 
underlying driving forces of these dynamics should receive more explicit attention. To 
comprehend this aspect of transnational elite formation in more detail, it is necessary 
to understand the conditions that turn national elites into members of the international 
elite (and vice versa). Further studies should take country characteristics into account, 
such as geographical distances, cultural differences, institutional variations in corporate 
governance systems and historical ties between countries (van Veen et al. 2014). Along 
these lines, paying further attention to company-level characteristics would comple-
ment analyses geared towards understanding when and how companies do or do not 
search for international board members. There is a need to consider relevant factors 
such as company size, international exposure, board recruitment strategies and cor-
porate distress more systematically.  
Second, transnational elite formation is subject to contextual processes outside the 
realm of the explicit boardroom of a specific corporation. We studied board turnover 
in relation to the financial crisis with a view to understanding how the crisis affected 
board composition as an indicator of financial elite formation. Although one can see 
the financial crisis as a unique event, there are plenty of opportunities to explore other 
relevant structural conditions. Important examples are the economic trade agreements 
(NAFTA, TTIP), the formation of the European Union (van Veen and Kratzer 2011) or 
the implementation of Brexit. 
Finally, the financial crisis exposed several major flaws in the corporate governance 
systems of the financial industry. Controlling bodies like the boards of directors of 
financial corporations apparently did not function properly and were incapable of 
understanding the increasing complexities of the financial world. When such 
governance failure happens in one isolated board (such as ENRON), it usually has 
consequences for the board members in question (usually damaged reputations and 
voluntary or involuntary exits, but also fines or even prison sentences). However, the 
financial crisis brought trouble to most financial corporations simultaneously and 
revealed systemic failure in the entire industry. Interestingly, this collective failure did 
not lead to an extreme level of turnover among board members. Turnover of board 
members began to rise only when the financial distress of an individual financial 
corporation became severe. Recruitment of new board members further strengthened 
pre-crisis trends such as the formation of a transnational financial elite. That the 
internationalization of the financial elite was negatively affected only when national 
governments intervened clearly shows that it is not a linear process. So, overall, the 
formation of the transnational elite seems rather resilient even in an extreme financial 
crisis. Apparently, the transnational elites have survived even the worst crisis, albeit 
strengthened in some places and weakened in others. On a macro level, the trans-
national elite turned out to be rather resilient to this external shock even though there 
are clearly a variety of opposing micro-level trends observable. This underlines the 
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need to extend our future analyses of antecedents of board dynamics to understand what 
strengthens and weakens the elite formation processes in more detail. 
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APPENDIX 1: Top 50 financial TNCs ranked by GSI, 2008  
(millions of US$ and number of employees) 











1 72.9 1 67.0 Citigroup Inc. US 1 938 470  322 800 
2 62.2 3 64.2 Allianz SE Germany 1 367 062  182 865 
3 59.8 10 54.0 ABN AMRO holding NV Netherlands 953 959  69 747 
4 59.5 4 60.2 Generali SpA Italy 549 269  84 063 
5 59.3 7 57.6 HSBC Holdings PLC UK 2 527 465  331 458 
6 59.0 11 52.7 Société Générale France 1 616 599  160 430 
7 57.6 6 59.0 Zurich Financial Services Switzerland 327 944  57 609 
8 57.0 5 59.1 UBS AG Switzerland 1 926 209  77 783 
9 56.7 9 56.3 Unicredito Italiano SpA Italy 1 495 868  174 519 
10 56.1 8 56.5 Axa France 963 539  109 304 
11 55.4 2 65.5 BNP Paribas France 2 969 315  173 188 
12 52.4 14 45.8 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 3 150 820  80 456 
13 51.2 17 42.2 American International Group Inc. US 860 418  116 000 
14 51.1 12 50.5 Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland 1 118 881  47 800 
15 50.0 15 45.6 Swiss Reinsurance Company Switzerland 229 328  11 560 
16 46.7 27 37.0 Dexia Belgium 931 339  28 099 
17 46.6 18 41.8 Crédit Agricole SA France 2 365 122  88 933 
18 44.3 21 39.9 Natixis France 795 079  22 096 
19 43.5 13 49.6 ING Groep NV Netherlands 1 905 097  124 661 
20 43.5 16 42.8 Banco Santander SA Spain 1 501 619  170 961 
21 41.0 22 38.9 KBC Group NV Belgium 508 322  59 510 
22 41.0 23 38.8 The Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 416 427  69 049 
23 39.9 31 34.5 Barclays PLC UK 3 001 433  151 500 
24 39.6 19 41.7 Fortis NV Belgium 132 861  10 374 
25 39.1 28 36.8 The Royal Bank of Canada Canada 593 814  73 323 
26 39.1 20 40.9 Merrill Lynch & Company Inc. US 667 543  58 500 
27 38.9 41 30.6 Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 910 062  108 310 
28 38.8 25 38.0 Standard Chartered PLC UK 435 068  73 802 
29 38.2 24 38.3 JPMorgan Chase & Company US 2 175 052  224 961 
30 37.7 29 35.8 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden 326 489  21 291 
31 37.7 30 34.7 Muenchener Rueckversicherung AG Germany 308 179  44 209 
32 36.7 32 34.3 Morgan Stanley US 658 812  46 964 
33 36.1 34 33.4 The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. US 884 547  30 067 
34 34.7 37 31.7 BBV Argentaria SA Spain 776 323  111 936 
35 34.6 36 32.4 Aviva PLC UK 518 365  54 758 
36 33.5 40 31.2 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. US 267 399  246 000 
37 33.4 38 31.4 Nordea Bank AB Sweden 678 217  34 008 
38 33.2 44 29.0 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 2 200 818  78 302 
39 33.2 33 34.0 Bank Of New York Mellon Corp. US 237 512  42 900 
40 32.7 35 33.4 Nomura Holdings Inc. Japan 275 059  18 026 
41 32.6 49 22.9 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC UK 3 511 187  199 000 
42 31.6 39 31.4 Manulife Financial Corp. Canada 308 782  24 000 
43 31.3 63 17.3 Hypo Real Estate Holding Germany 600 363  1 786 
44 31.1 58 19.5 DnB Nor ASA Norway 263 592  14 057 
45 27.3 47 24.8 Prudential PLC UK 315 120  29 683 
46 26.6 45 27.0 Aegon NV Netherlands 410 957  31 425 
47 26.5 48 24.7 Mizuho Financial Group Inc. Japan 1 691 286  49 114 
48 26.2 42 29.4 Danske Bank A/S Denmark 680 095  23 624 
49 25.8 55 19.9 Bank of Ireland PLC Ireland 277 705  16 026 
50 25.6 53 21.5 Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 280 726  10 833 
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APPENDIX 2: Cumulative write-downs and capital raisings per financial 
transnational corporations (first quarter 2007–third quarter 2008) (in billion US$)* 
Financial TNCs Write-downs Capital raisings 
Citigroup Inc. 60.8 71.1 
Allianz SE 04.1 00.0 
ABN AMRO holding NV 02.3 00.0 
Generali SpA 02.0 00.0 
HSBC Holdings PLC 27.4 21.6 
Société Générale 06.8 16.8 
Zurich Financial Services 00.6 00.0 
UBS AG 44.2 28.3 
Unicredito Italiano SpA 02.8 05.4 
Axa 03.8 03.0 
BNP Paribas 04.0 06.3 
Deutsche Bank AG 10.8 06.1 
American International Group Inc. 90.8 82.2 
Credit Suisse Group AG 10.5 11.6 
Swiss Reinsurance Company 01.7 02.6 
Dexia 01.6 00.0 
Crédit Agricole SA 08.8 08.5 
Natixis 05.3 11.8 
ING Groep NV 06.7 04.8 
Banco Santander SA 01.1 00.0 
KBC Group NV 10.7 05.7 
The Bank of Nova Scotia 01.5 00.0 
Barclays PLC 09.1 18.6 
Fortis NV 07.4 23.1 
The Royal Bank of Canada 02.2 00.0 
Intesa Sanpaolo 00.7 02.2 
Standard Chartered PLC 00.5 01.5 
JPMorgan Chase & Company 18.8 19.7 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 00.3 00.0 
Muenchener Rueckversicherung AG 00.6 00.0 
Morgan Stanley 15.7 14.6 
The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 04.9 10.6 
BBV Argentaria SA 01.0 00.0 
Aviva PLC 00.5 00.0 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 00.8 00.0 
Nordea Bank AB 01.0 03.3 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 01.6 04.5 
Nomura Holdings Inc. 03.4 06.8 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 14.9 24.3 
Manulife Financial Corp. 02.4 04.7 
Hypo Real Estate Holding 03.6 00.0 
DnB Nor ASA 01.7 02.4 
Prudential PLC 02.0 00.0 
Aegon NV 02.7 01.0 
Mizuho Financial Group Inc. 06.1 05.7 
Danske Bank A/S 02.0 00.0 
Bank of Ireland PLC 05.2 04.4 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 00.5 00.0 
*Euros converted to US$ with the XE online money converter. 
